[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.)t t Indeed, one reason Clintonwanted to free up exports of supercomputersin addition to the marketpressureswas that only with a supercomputer-run  stockpile mainte-nance program, which involves simulating nuclear tests on a computer,can nuclear powers be persuaded to maintain their weapons withoutactual testing.He hoped to induce Beijing to accept the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treatywhich in 1996 it did, and it has not conducted a nucleartest since then.But the Bush administration, with its aversion to anyinfringement on U.S.sovereignty, resolutely opposes reviving the treaty.Unfortunately this stance has left the administration without any viablemeans of containing China s nuclear and weapons program, given theself-defeating nature of export controls. 158 At War with OurselvesAmerica could still just throw government money at the problem ofmaintaining its still-huge defense edgeas long as it doesn t mind a per-manent return to Cold War era defense spending, of course.In the after-math of September 11, Bush requested more for defense R&D, once againleaving the Europeans in the dust.Funds set aside in the Defense Depart-ment s 2003 budget for research, development, testing, and evaluationamounted to more than $50 billion.This was more than the combinedsum that other industrial nations earmark for developing new militarytechnology (the fifteen European Union countries spent a total of only $9billion on defense R&D in 2001).But as a senior Defense Departmentofficial put it to me, that still doesn t come close to the trillions spent onR&D in the private sector.The best course, he said, was still to  buy the 80percent solution rather than spending a gajillion dollars and several mil-lion man-hours in creating the 85 percent solution. t u And Bush, facedwith new, record budget deficits midway through his administration, nolonger had the wherewithal to create the 85 percent solution.The real key to maintaining America s defense edge indefinitely is tomaintain the vibrancy of our commercial industrial base at the same timeas we work anew on multilateral regimes.And like so much else about thePermanent Quagmire, that again means working with the internationalcommunity.As we have seen, American policy makers still have not fully grappledwith the realities of America s twenty-first-century power base.In the nextchapter we will examine the pitfalls of another old way of unilateral think-ing: the idea that America can trumpet its values abroad as it once did, andexpect the world to follow.Much as America s defense base has nowbecome globalized, so American ideas about democracy and open marketshave become globalized.Much as our technology is spreading in an opensystem, the dissemination of these American ideas has meant they are tak-ing on a life of their own.For a long time we have deemed this to be anunalloyed benefit, like the global marketplace.But it s not that simple. 5When Ideas Bite BackThere is no country on earth that is not touched by America, forwe have become the motive force for freedom and democracy inthe world.Colin L.PowellIn word and deed, we must be clear and consistent and confi-dent that our values are real.President-elect George W.Bush, December 16, 2000If Americans know one thing for certain, it is that their values areright not just for them, but for the world.This is a bedrock belief thatunites left and right, the Wilsonian internationalists of the Clintonadministration and the powerful neoconservatives of the Bush adminis-tration.It is a sense that they can make the world a better and safer placeby asserting America s power and spreading cardinal American valuessuch as democracy and free markets, if only the world would stand backand let them do it.This chapter is about why this practice is likely to failin the futureironically enough, because it has succeeded so well in thepast.It is about why we Americans must depend on the institutions of theinternational system we built, such as the UN and WTO, to do the mainwork of continuing to promote these values, even though this rubsagainst our national grain.The alternative is that we will find ourselvescaught up in endless self-contradiction and accusations of hypocrisyatwar with our own ideas.Here s why.The world has already heard an earful from America.Andit has listened well.In the last century the United States did an admirablejob of vanquishing fascism and spending (most) communist regimes out 160 At War with Ourselvesof existence.We succeeded not just because we were militarily or economi-cally stronger, but because we prided ourselves on having stronger ideas,among them democracy, self-determination, and free markets.Not onlydid we want to defeat our enemies, but beginning with Wilson we insistedthey adopt our philosophy as well, pursuing what Henry Kissinger hascalled the  age-old American dream of a peace achieved by the conversionof the adversary. Washington achieved this to an astounding degree, pre-siding over the conversion of most of the former Soviet bloc to democraticcapitalism, nurturing similar transitions in Japan, South Korea, and Tai-wan, not to mention most of South Americaand along the way makingsome form of democratic capitalism the standard to which other peoplesaspire.As we saw in previous chapters, this American evangelism hashelped create a vibrant international community.But the internationalcommunity has a down side that we have only just begun to reckon with.Now American ideas, having saturated the globeas much as McDonald shamburgers and Disney moviesare coming back to haunt U.S.policymakers.And since the Cold War ended, the biggest headaches have comefrom two of our nation s most powerful ideological exports, Wilsonianismand free markets.Most of these ideas have been accepted in principle; nowit is the flaws and inconsistencies of these ideasand America s inconsis-tency in applying themthat rule the scene.I call this phenomenon  ideological blowback [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]



php include("s/6.php") ?>